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W h a t ’ s  I n  I t  F o r  M e ?  
CE O s  W h o s e  F ir ms  Ar e  Ac q u i r e d  
 
 
Ab stract 
W e stud y bene fits rec eived b y t ar get comp an y CEOs in completed mer ge rs  and 
acq u i s i t i o n s .   T h es e ex ec u t i v es  o b t ai n  w eal t h  i n cr eas es  w i t h  a m ed i an o f $ 4 t o  $ 5  m i l l i o n  
and a mean o f $8 to $11 million, roughl y in line with the permanent inco me streams that 
t h e y s a cri fi c e.  C E O s  re c ei v e l o w er fi n an ci al  gai n s  from  t h o s e t rans a ct i o n s  i n  w h i ch  t h e y 
b ecom e ex ecut i v es  o f t h e  b u ye r, s u g ges t i n g t h at  t r adeoffs  ex i s t  b et w een t h e  fi n an ci al  an d  
care er- relat ed bene fits the y ex tract.  W e find ver y high rat es of turnove r both at the time 
of the mer ge r and, fo r those ex ecutives who sta y, for seve ral ye ars post-me rger. 
R egr es s i o n  es t i m at es  s u g ges t  t h at  t a r get  s h ar eh o l d ers  re cei v e l o w er a cq u i s i t i o n  p rem i a i n  
transactions that involve ex traordinar y person al tr eatment of the CEO. 
1  Salpukis (1999) describes how the proposed acquisition of Texaco Inc. by Chevron Corp. initially fell through
because Chevron’s CEO “was not willing to share power with” his Texaco counterpart.  Burton and Tanouye (1998)
discuss the failure of the merger of American Home Products Corp. and Monsanto Co. due to managerial disagreements
that “ranged from who should be assigned to corporate headquarters to compensation for top executives.”  The
announcement of this deal’s collapse caused a one-day $14 billion decline in the comapnies’ joint market capitalization. 
Lipin (1996) provides several additional examples.
2  For example, Hechinger (1999) reports that as part of his company’s merger agreement with Fleet Financial
Group, the CEO of BankBoston Corp. extracted a promise that he would become CEO of the buyer at the end of 2001
unless 80 percent of the board objected at that time to his appointment.  If so, the company would be required to pay $15
million to the CEO’s charitable foundation.
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What’s In It For Me?
CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired
1 . Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions often hinge upon a transaction’s financial, employment and other
benefits for top managers.  Self-interested executives bargain not only over the price to be paid to
target shareholders, but also over such items as who will occupy the CEO position in the merged
company, who will sit on the board of directors, the location of headquarters, whether the
company name will change, and especially, executive compensation.  The news media has
reported the collapse of numerous high-profile merger discussions because of managers’ inability
to reach compromises over these personal benefits, indicating that severe agency problems can
prevent economically beneficial transactions from occurring. 1   Further stories have reported
elaborate, lucrative packages of personal benefits negotiated by target CEOs as conditions for
agreeing to their firms’ acquisition. 2
2We study a sample of several hundred completed U.S. acquisitions in the late 1990s,
documenting the benefits, financial and otherwise, received from the transactions by the CEOs of
the target companies.  We expect that target CEOs will attempt to extract large personal benefits
from merger transactions to compensate for the losses of compensation, power, and prestige that
occur when they agree to sell their companies.  These benefits might take the form of either
increased financial wealth or attractive positions in the management team of the buyer.  In
addition, we expect that CEOs might be willing to compromise the interests of their own
shareholders in pursuit of these benefits, possibly negotiating less favorable acquisition terms in
those deals in which they personally fare well.
We focus on CEOs for several reasons.  First, in a typical firm, the CEO is frequently the
largest stock and option holder, meaning they have the largest potential gain due to a successful
merger.  CEOs typically bear the highest personal costs of a merger as well, since giving up the
top job will likely lead to a loss of prestige and future compensation.  Second, due to CEOs’
power and influence over management and the board, CEOs are likely to have a fundamental role
in determining the outcome of merger negotiations.  Third, previous research has highlighted the
importance of target CEO characteristics in mergers and acquisitions.  For example, Cotter and
Zenner (1994) discuss the effects of tender offers and resistance by the target firm on top-
executive wealth.  Studies including McConnell and Martin (1991), Agrawal and Walkling (1994)
and Hadlock, Houston and Ryngaert (1999) have shown a link between the market for top
management and the market for corporate control.
We collect information on such variables as stock and option appreciation, golden
parachute payments, additional cash bonuses awarded at the time of the transaction, the CEO’s
3position in the new firm, his role on the new board of directors, the survival rates of those CEOs
who remain with the merged firm, and, for those CEOs who leave, their subsequent employment
histories.  While other papers have studied some of these variables, we believe ours is the first to
explore them in a unified framework in which we can calculate comprehensive measures of CEO
gains from acquisitions and evaluate tradeoffs among the different pieces.
Figure 1, a schematic of the career paths of the target CEOs in our sample, illustrates
many of our findings.  The figure indicates an overwhelming incidence of job losses for target
CEOs: about two-thirds of this group leave their firms at the time of the merger, and of the one-
third who remain employed, 36 percent do not survive for the first two post-deal years.  Those
CEOs who exit appear to earn substantially higher financial returns from the merger, however, as
shown in the summary statistics to the right of the terminal nodes.  This suggests a clear tradeoff
between financial rewards and job offers in the buyer, a conjecture supported by our more
detailed analysis below.  Only a very small number of target CEOs become top executives of the
acquirer.  Job security is quite low for all former CEOs who remain with the merged firm, with
post-merger turnover rates in the neighborhood of 20 percent to 30 percent annually
(unconditional turnover rates for top managers are close to 10 percent ordinarily).  The
overwhelming majority of those target CEOs who exit the firm do not obtain further employment;
a large number probably retire voluntarily due to their multi-million dollar gains from the merger.
The CEOs in our sample obtain total financial gains with a median value of approximately
$4 to $5 million and a mean of $8 to $11 million.  While the distribution exhibits an upper tail that
includes truly large windfalls for some target CEOs, for most executives these monetary benefits
appear roughly in line with the permanent income streams that they lose from the disappearance
4of their prior jobs.  These results are somewhat surprising to us, since the mid-1990s time frame
of the sample implies that we have an overwhelming majority of friendly acquisitions (Schwert,
2000) in which CEOs could likely have chosen to keep their firms independent.
We present regression estimates suggesting that target CEOs negotiate lower acquisition
premia for their own shareholders in transactions that involve extraordinary personal treatment of
the CEO.  These transactions are characterized by special payments to the CEO at the time of the
merger, as well as high-ranking managerial posts in the buyer and membership on the buyer’s
board of directors.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews related
literature about managerial characteristics and corporate control activity.  Section 3 describes our
sample selection and data gathering.  Section 4 describes the gains received by target CEOs as a
result of the acquisitions, and section 5 presents a regression analysis of the tradeoffs among
different types of gains.  Section 6 concludes.
2 . Literature review
The notion that executives extract personal benefits from managing the firm is common in
the corporate finance literature.  Many theoretical papers use personal benefits of control as a
modeling assumption; for two recent examples, see Fluck (1999) and Berkovitch and Israel
(1996).  These benefits can cause agency problems that reduce the value of the firm, and the
market for corporate control provides a vital mechanism for mitigating these problems.
Our investigation of the benefits received by target CEOs in completed mergers
complements a previous literature studying managerial incentives in corporate control activity. 
5Much of the prior literature documents target management's ability to take actions in their own
interests rather than those of the shareholders at various stages of the acquisition process.  For
example, a firm's attractiveness as a takeover candidate may be decreasing in managerial
ownership, due to management's reluctance to give up their positions or control of the firm (e.g.,
Mikkelson and Partch, 1989).  Conditional on receiving an offer, managers may resist the
proposed combination in order to protect their personal benefits at the expense of shareholders'
wealth (e.g., Cotter and Zenner, 1994).
 Personal stock ownership represents one clear source of potential variation in target
managers’ attitudes toward selling their firms.  Stulz (1988) argues that higher managerial
ownership results in two competing effects.  First, firms with higher ownership are less likely to
be subject to an acquisition attempt due to the CEO’s voting control.  Second, conditional on an
attempt being made, firms with higher managerial ownership are expected to receive a higher
price due to the CEO’s bargaining power.  Empirical evidence has been largely consistent with
these implications.  For example, Song and Walkling (1993) find that acquisition targets have
lower ownership than their industry's average, or corresponding matching firms.  For attempts
that are eventually successful, managerial ownership is positively related to abnormal returns on
the target's stock over the period from announcement through outcome.  Mikkelson and Partch
(1989) find no relation between the likelihood of a successful acquisition and management's
control of the target.  This lack of a relation, however, is due to two offsetting effects.  The
probability of receiving a takeover offer is decreasing in management ownership, but the
probability that an offer (if made) leads to a change in control increases with management
ownership.
6Related work has documented relations between variables other than management
ownership and the likelihood of takeovers and acquisitions.  For example, Shivdasani (1993)
argues that the board of directors acts as a substitute mechanism for corporate control, while
unaffiliated blockholding acts as a complementary mechanism.  He finds that the likelihood of a
hostile takeover attempt is decreasing (increasing) in the ownership stake of the outside directors
(affiliated blockholders).  Aside from governance and incentive variables, many studies have
shown a relation between firm performance and the likelihood of being an acquisition target (e.g.,
Palepu, 1986).
Once an offer has been made, management's response depends on the incentive
mechanisms in place.  Cotter and Zenner (1994) and Walkling and Long (1984) argue that
management's resistance to tender offers appears driven by concern over its own interests rather
than those of shareholders.  Both studies document that management resistance is negatively
related to the change in managerial wealth, an effect attributed by the former study to the change
in wealth due to managerial share ownership.  Further, Cotter and Zenner (1994) show that
management gains on average from resisting tender offers (while shareholders do not), and that
the probability of a successful offer is increasing in the change in managerial wealth.
Hadlock, Houston and Ryngaert (1999) argue that managers' incentive to act in their own
interests also affects the likelihood of being acquired.  They show that for a sample of bank
acquisitions, banks with higher ownership are less likely to be acquired.  This result is especially
strong for observations where the target managers leave the firm following the acquisition.  They
interpret the results as consistent with the hypothesis that the degree of managerial entrenchment
is an important determinant of the probability that a bank is acquired.
7Wulf (2001) studies a sample of “mergers of equal” between firms with roughly similar
size.  She finds that target shareholders’ stocks exhibit lower abnormal returns at the time of
merger announcements if a “CEO succession agreement” is negotiated as part of the transaction. 
However, her definition of “succession agreement” is extremely broad, as it covers any
arrangement in which either the CEO or chairman position is reserved for the target’s CEO; such
agreements could, for example, call for the retirement of the target CEO after a nominal amount
of time in office, or confine him to ceremonial responsibilities as a non-executive chairman.
Hadlock at al. (1999), Agrawal and Walkling (1994), and Martin and McConnell (1991)
document high rates of managerial turnover for target firms following corporate control activity. 
Hadlock et al. find that 53.6 percent of their sample's top executives leave the banking
organizations within two years of the date the merger agreement is finalized.  Agrawal and
Walkling (1994) calculate the retention and dismissal rates of CEOs for a set of firms receiving
takeover bids.  They find that only 45 percent of the target CEOs are retained one year after the
bid.  Successful bids result in even larger departure rates; for this subsample, 65 percent of the
CEOs are not employed as senior executives in any public corporation one year after the bid. 
Martin and McConnell focus on turnover of top managers of targets of successful tender offers. 
They find a turnover rate of 41.9 percent for the target's top manager in the year following the
takeover, and 19 percent during the second post-turnover year.  They classify takeovers in which
the target's top executive leaves the firm as disciplinary.   They then show that disciplinary
takeovers are associated with poor performance by the target prior to the tender offer, while non-
disciplinary takeovers are not.  Additionally, gains to both bidders and targets are independent of
the type of takeover (disciplinary or non-disciplinary).
8Agrawal and Walkling (1994) and Harford (2000) consider the effects of takeover bids on
management and directors in terms of Fama’s (1980) notion of “ex post settling up.”  Agrawal
and Walkling, studying a sample of target CEOs between 1980 and 1986, find that post-bid
changes in compensation are negatively related to pre-bid abnormal compensation.  They interpret
this as consistent with the view that the labor market uses information produced by the takeover
process to discipline managers.  Harford finds evidence consistent with directors also experiencing
ex post settling up following takeover bids that occurred between 1988 and 1991.  He shows that
outside directors generally fare worse financially than inside directors following the bid, and the
outcome is related to both pre-bid performance and the target’s reception of the offer. 
Specifically, outside directors of poorly performing firms fare worse in the directorial labor
market, especially if the target rebuffs the offer.  If the firm accepts the offer, the directors’ losses
are mitigated.
Mørck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) argue that disciplinary takeovers typically appear to be
hostile in nature, while mergers for synergistic reasons tend to be friendly.  They find that
characteristics other than financial incentives of target managers differ across these two types of
deals.  Segmenting acquisitions into friendly and hostile, they document a relation between
managerial ownership and the type of acquisition.  Compared to hostile mergers, friendly
acquisitions are associated with greater stock ownership by directors and offices, and increased
incidence of founding family members managing the target firm.  Large managerial ownership
appears to encourage friendly acquisitions, but not significantly discourage hostile ones.  The
performance of friendly targets is basically indistinguishable from that of non-targets in their
sample, while hostile-takeover targets are associated with poor relative performance. Mørck et al.
9(p. 104) interpret their evidence as "consistent with the view that hostile targets and friendly
targets are very different types of companies."
While we focus on the incentives of the target firm's management, a separate literature has
analyzed the incentives of the acquiring firm's management.  A recent example is Datta,
Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001), who find a link between incentive compensation and the
results of firms' acquisitions.  Specifically, the authors find that as the the ratio of management's
option compensation to total compensation increases, acquisition premiums decrease,
announcement returns increase, and post-acquistion performance improves.  They also find that
firms whose managers receive more equity-based pay acquire different types of firms; their targets
have larger market-to-book ratios and their mergers lead to greater increase in stock-price
volatility.
3 . Sample selection and data description
We analyze a sample of 311 transactions identified from the mergers and acquisitions
database of Securities Data Company.  We begin with all completed U.S. mergers with
announcement dates between January 1, 1995, and December 31, 1997.  Given the time frame
studied, the large majority of deals are friendly acquisitions as discussed below.  We require that
(i) both firms be publicly traded and listed on the Center for Research in Securities Prices
database; (ii) both have market capitalizations exceeding $100 million four weeks prior to the
announcement date; (iii) the buyer purchase at least 90 percent ownership of the target; and (iv)
the ratio of the two firms’ market capitalizations lies within the range of 0.10 to 10.00, to rule out
transactions with extreme size disparities in which the target CEO would have little bargaining
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power.  These screens yield a candidate sample of 320 deals.  We drop eight observations in
which the acquiror already held a dominant ownership position in the target, and one transaction
involving a Canadian firm that was not required to meet the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s filing requirements.
We focus our data gathering efforts on the remaining 311 target companies and their
CEOs.  For each of these, we attempt to obtain information from three SEC filings: (i) the Proxy
Statement, Form 10-K or similar document containing ownership and compensation data in
advance of the last annual meeting before the acquisition announcement; (ii) the Proxy Statement,
Form S-4, or other document (if any) filed in connection with the transaction; and (iii) the first
Proxy Statement of the acquiring company filed after the merger becomes effective.  Our final
sample for regression analysis includes information about 239 target CEOs, meaning that we have
missing values for at least one variable for 72 out of 311 companies, or 23 percent.  The main
sources of missing values are variables related to golden parachutes and related merger payments
(missing for 39 CEOs), stock and option ownership data (missing for 26 CEOs), and cash
compensation data (missing for 22 CEOs).
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics about the CEOs in our sample companies.  The
typical CEO is about 54 years old, with median stock and option ownership of 0.8 percent and 1.1
percent of the company’s shares outstanding, respectively (mean values are slightly higher).  The
median salary + bonus cash compensation for CEOs in the year prior to the acquisition is about
$521,000 (mean $798,000).  Many of the CEOs share power with at least one other top
executive: in 30.5 percent of the firms someone else holds the title of chairman of the board, while
in 28.5 of the sample some other executive serves as president of the company.  We are unable to
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calculate statistics about the tenure in office of many CEOs, since a significant proportion of the
sample companies disclose only that their CEOs have served for more than five years.  Our
sample is almost equally split between CEOs who have served less than five years and five or
more years.
Information about our sample of transactions appears in Table 2.  The median target firm
has market capitalization of $386 million (mean $1.28 billion), measured one month prior to the
date of the first offer made by the buyer.  The ratio of the target’s market cap divided by the
buyer’s has a median of 0.317 (mean of 0.442), indicating that some size disparity exists between
the two companies in most of our transactions, but not to a severe extent.  Just 2.6 percent of our
transactions begin with unsolicited bids, according to SDC.
We measure the takeover premium to target shareholders using information from both
SDC and CRSP.  SDC reports a median premium of 30.4 percent (mean of 34.8 percent) over the
four weeks prior to the transaction announcement.  This statistic assumes that the deal will
ultimately close according to the terms announced in the merger agreement.  If the consideration
paid to target shareholders is stock in the buyer, the SDC premium uses a pre-announcement
value of the buyer’s stock price.  We calculate an alternative measure of the takeover premium
from the CRSP database, measuring the stock’s run-up over the 20 days prior to the
announcement, and we find lower premia with a median of 21.1 percent (mean of 22.7 percent). 
These smaller gains in target equity value might capture a variety of effects, including a post-
announcement decline in the buyer’s stock price, skepticism that the deal will be completed
according to its announced terms, or the time value of money if the approval process is expected
to be lengthy.
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4 . Benefits received by target CEOs
Table 3 presents more detailed information about the wealth increases experienced by
target CEOs as well as their post-merger role in the governance of the buyer company.  We
estimate that CEOs earn a median of approximately $4 to $5 million in increased wealth (mean of
$8 to $11 million) as a result of the acquisition, depending on whether we use the 20-day CRSP
or four-week SDC premium as the basis for our calculations.  Maximum values run into the
hundreds of millions of dollars.  Data in Table 3 indicate that for the median CEO, the total wealth
gains equal roughly six to eight times annual cash compensation (10 to 15 times for the mean
CEO).  In the context of the high rates of CEO departure described below, these wealth gains
appear to represent a rough substitute for the present value of compensation the CEOs might have
expected to receive if they had remained in their jobs until retirement, something that we explore
further in regression analysis.
4.1 Stock and option holdings
The largest source of wealth increase comes from appreciation of the CEO’s direct
stockholdings, whch we calculate by multiplying the percentage acquisition premium by the
CEO’s pre-announcement equity ownership value.  These calculations indicate a median CEO
stock appreciation of slightly more than $1.3 million, with a much higher mean of about $4.2
million.
For appreciation of the CEO’s options, data limitations force us to calculate an upper
bound; we assume that all options are at- or in-the-money prior to the transaction, and we
3  This calculation simplifies the data in two respects.  First, some parachute payouts are based on cash
compensation not in the year prior to the transaction, but instead according to a more elaborate formula such as the
maximum for the three years prior to the transaction.  The diversity of these approaches would make our calculations
prohibitively complex, so we use the final year’s compensation to keep the analysis manageable.  Second, we make an
assumption that all parachutes are actually triggered by the mergers and acquisitions in our sample.  This may not be
strictly true if certain deals do not qualify as “changes in control” necessary to activate the parachutes.  However, we do not
have enough information to make this determination conclusively for many transactions, and we observe that in a large
number of SEC merger filings that companies go out of their way to resolve any ambiguity by stipulating that a change in
control has occurred for purposes of golden parachute payments.  Our treatment of parachute payments in this way means
that our estimates probably represent upper bound on the amount that CEOs actually obtain.
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multiply the raw dollar value premium per share by the number of options held.  This calculation
assumes that all options are “cashed out” via forced exercise at the time of the transaction, which
is quite common practice according to our readings of SEC filings.  Our analysis shows median
and mean option gains of about $230,000 and $656,000, respectively, only about one-sixth as
large as the corresponding statistics for direct stock appreciation.
4.2 Golden parachutes and related merger payments
CEOs also obtain significant merger-related wealth increases from golden parachutes and
similar payments.  Sixty-nine percent of the CEOs in our sample have golden parachute
arrangements in place, according to the proxy statements filed in the year prior to the acquisition. 
The typical structure of these incentive plans calls for a lump-sum payment equal to a multiple of
the CEO’s salary and bonus prior to the deal (for tax reasons, this multiple equals three in a large
number of cases).  We calculate the parachute payout to CEOs by applying the formula from each
company’s golden parachute plan to the CEO’s cash salary and bonus in the year prior to the
deal. 3   Including the 31 percent of observations with zero parachute payments, CEOs receive a
median of $900,000 (mean of $1.465 million) from this source.
For a non-trivial fraction of the CEOs in our sample, 12.1 percent, the parachute payments
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are augmented by the target’s board of directors at the time that it approves the merger.  In these
cases, boards vote to increase the CEO’s parachute value and shareholders learn of the change
after the fact from an SEC filing.  The mean value of the CEO wealth increase from this source is
about $393,500; dividing this figure by the frequency of .121 indicates that when boards do vote
to augment the CEO’s parachute, the average value increase is about $3.25 million.
Separately from golden parachute payments, some firms make special cash payments to
their CEOs as part of the terms of the merger.  We find these additional payments in 74 of 272
cases, or about 27.2 percent of the sample.  The mean CEO wealth increase from this source is
about $1.2 million; dividing by the frequency of .272 indicates that the average special merger
bonus equals $4.41 million.  We collect information about firms’ stated rationales for these
additional payments to CEOs.  Twenty-eight cases purportedly represent consulting agreements,
and 26 more payments are characterized as non-competition agreements between the CEO and
the buyer.  An additional 11 cases represent payments made in consideration of the cancellation of
the CEO’s employment agreement or other contract rights.  Other payouts are described as a
“stay bonus” (5 observations), “retention bonus” (3), “special service recognition bonus,” “signing
bonus,” and “bonus” (2 each), and “transition bonus,” “closing bonus,” and constructive change-
in-control bonus (1 each).
4.3 Comparison of CEO financial gains with earlier studies
Our analysis of CEO financial benefits from acquisitions can be contrasted with
information from two papers studying takeovers in earlier periods.  Cotter and Zenner’s (1994)
study of managerial resistance to tender offers includes a subsample of 99 completed acquisitions
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in 1989-90.  Firms in their subsample are not directly comparable to ours, as they have much
smaller mean market cap of $663 million.  The characteristics of the acquisitions are also quite
different, with a significant number of hostile transactions (36 percent) and much larger takeover
premia (a mean of 65 percent).  The authors report that the top executive in these acquired
companies obtains gains on stock and option holdings with a mean value of $14.1 million, and
golden parachute payments with a mean of $0.9 million, numbers that are quite close to our
results.  While these CEOs run smaller firms, they own significantly more stock (a mean of 7.5
percent of shares outstanding) than our sample CEOs; this ownership level combined with the
larger premia received make their financial gains comparable to those in our study.  Cotter and
Zenner’s executives earn mean cash compensation of $496,000 annually, meaning that their
merger gains are approximately 30 times annual pay, a larger multiple than found for our CEOs.
Walkling and Long (1984) also study managerial resistance in a sample of 95 tender offers
between 1972-77.  Unfortunately, their paper does not disaggregate managerial wealth effects
based upon the success of the offers, but their earlier sample exhibits far lower financial gains for
CEOs.  The authors find an average wealth change for the top-ranked executive from stock and
option appreciation of $713,750 for uncontested offers and $192,000 ($161,210) for contested,
or $505,050 for the unified sample.  This gain represents an average of 8.6 times the annual salary
of these managers.  The gain may be lower due to the less widespread use of stock options as
managerial incentives during the early 1970s.
Agrawal and Walkling (1994) detail severance payments for 13 target CEOs who left their
firms after a takeover bid.  They estimate an average present value of $2.3 million for these
payments.  In contrast, we estimate that CEOs receive a mean value of about $3.1 million from
16
parachute payouts, parachute augmentations, and special merger bonuses.
4.4 Target CEO’s subsequent role with the buyer
In addition to the impact of an acquisition on their personal wealth, CEOs might agree to
the sale of their firms because of the prospect of an important position as an executive in the
merged company.
More than half of the target CEOs in our sample initially remain with the buyer in some
capacity.  Panel B of Table 3 indicates that just over 50 percent of target CEOs accept jobs as
officers of the merged firm (including non-executive chairman and vice chairman of the board),
similar to the acquisition-related turnover data reported by Hadlock at al. (1999) and Martin and
McConnell (1991).  Additionally, 57 percent of target CEOs join the board of directors of the
buyer.  This is notably higher than the survival of CEOs as directors documented by Harford
(2000), who finds that 27 percent of CEOs get board seats; the disparity may be due to the
greater frequency of hostile acquisitions in Harford’s sample.  A small number of the target CEOs
play top leadership roles in the merged firm: nine take over the buyer’s CEO position, 15 serve as
president and/or chief operating officer, and ten become non-executive chairman of the board.
Further data in Panel B indicate that target firms obtain additional governance-related
considerations.  Targets place a median of two directors (mean of 2.3) on the board of the buyer,
one of whom is usually but not always the target’s CEO.  The buyer’s board is controlled one-
sixth by directors from the target subsequent to the median transaction.  In about one-seventh of
all transactions, the buyer agrees to change the company name, generally to incorporate part of
the target’s name.
4  A certain number of companies disappear from our analysis, either because the buyer itself is acquired by a
third firm, or because not enough time has passed for three years of data to accumulate.
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Table 4 presents information about the fate of CEOs who remain with the buyer. 
Compensation becomes higher for these executives, as their salaries rise by a median of 8.6
percent (mean of 17.6 percent) and their bonuses increase by a median of 19.4 percent (mean of
34.3 percent).  However, the survival rates for target CEOs are strikingly low.  We read the first
proxy statement filed by the buyer in the aftermath of the merger to determine whether target
CEOs who had taken a position in the merged firm are still in place; for unclear cases, we also
consulted 10-K filings, news reports, and related sources.  After one year, the fraction of target
CEOs serving as executives of the buyer drops from .503 to .344, meaning that only 65.6 percent
of ex-CEOs survive their first year in office as an executive of the target.  
Panel B of Table 4 presents more detailed data about the survival rates of target CEOs
who become executives of the parent.  We separate these officers into four gradations: (a) CEO,
president, and chairman; (b) other executive officers; (c) executives in subsidiaries of the buyer
(such as CEOs who remain as CEOs of the target once it becomes wholly owned by the buyer);
and (d) vice chairman of the board, a title that usually carries little or no operating responsibility. 
We extend our analysis by reading proxy statements filed for the three years after the acquisition. 4  
All categories of executives have extremely high departure rates.  First-year departure rates range
from 23.1 percent for officers in the top-three category to 59.3 percent for vice chairmen.  After
three years, 67.3 percent of top-three offices and 78.3 percent of subsidiary executives are gone,
and departure rates are similarly high for vice chairmen and executives in other positions.
Data are similar but not quite as dramatic for ex-CEOs serving on boards, as just 77.6
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percent of this group remain as directors after 1 year.
These turnover rates far exceed those found in most studies of CEOs and corporate
directors.  For comparison purposes, Parrino (1997) reports unconditional turnover rates for
CEOs of 12.2 percent annually, while data in Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) indicate an
unconditional turnover rate for directors of about 9 percent annually.  Our results are more in line
with Gilson’s (1990) presentation of very low survival rates for officers and directors in financially
distressed firms.
Some of the ex-CEOs who do not survive as executives of the buyer collect substantial
severance packages (these do not enter into our calculation of merger-related wealth changes
discussed above).  Of the 146 ex-CEOs who we identify as becoming executives of the buyer, 48
are no longer listed as executives in the first proxy statement filed after the transaction.  Of these
48, 37 collect severance payments with a median value of $1.5 million, mean of $3.77 million, and
maximum of $30 million.
One reason for the high turnover rates of target CEOs after they join the buyer is that
some of their appointments are made with pre-specified limited time horizons.  We find 18 such
cases out of the 146 CEOs who become executives of the buyer, a rate of about 12 percent.  The
life of these agreements range from a few months (until the next annual meeting) to five years.
For those CEOs who leave, their exit from the firm very often represents the end of their
careers.  We tracked the future employment of all exiting CEOs in our sample by using on-line
keyword searches of SEC filings and the Dow Jones News Service.  As shown in Figure 1, we
find that the large majority of CEOs who leave – whether at the time of the merger or within the
two-year period thereafter – end up either retired, working in a non-profit or government job, or
5  In two further cases the agreement arguably became moot, as one controversial CEO was prevented by
government utility regulators from taking office, and another negotiated the sale of the firm before the date at which he was
due to step down.  News reports have indicated that an eighth succession “handshake“ agreement was negotiated for one
of the mergers in our sample (Morgan Stanley - Dean Witter) but not disclosed at the time of the deal.  This agreement also
was not implemented.
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simply vanished from our large array of data sources.  A smaller group become investors or start-
up entrepreneurs.  About one-sixth of the total sample eventually end up in executive posts in
other firms, the large majority as CEOs.
We find that some target CEOs negotiate explicit succession agreements to secure their
positions in the new firm, but these agreements are generally not honored.  In four cases, the
target CEO becomes the CEO of the buyer but is required to surrender the job within a specified
period; in three additional cases, the target CEO becomes chairman and chief operating officer of
the buyer, with the stipulation that he will ascend to the CEO position within a certain period.  In
only one instance of these seven (the merger of Nynex and Bell Atlantic) did the CEO position
ultimately change hands as called for in the original agreement. 5
5 . Regression analysis
When CEOs bargain with the acquiror over acquisition terms that affect them personally,
we conjecture that they engage in tradeoffs between cash payments, their position in the merged
company, board seats, and other personal benefits.  We expect that these tradeoffs are influenced
by personal characteristics of CEOs, especially age (a proxy for the time left until expected
retirement) and the extent to which they dominate the corporate governance of the target firm.
A second set of more nefarious tradeoffs may also exist.  Target CEOs might be expected
to sell the firm at an attractive price if their personal benefits from the transaction are large.  Since
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a low takeover premium for target shareholders would also depress the CEO’s own stock and
option appreciation, we might expect CEOs to accept lower takeover premia only if they receive
prominent jobs in the management of the buyer or special compensation arrangements not directly
related to equity value.
We conduct regression analysis in an attempt to illuminate the relative magnitude of some
of these tradeoffs.  Our regressions test several hypotheses about patterns in which we expect
CEOs to seek to extract personal benefits from the buyer:
1 . CEOs who do not become officers of the acquiror should obtain greater monetary
gains from the acquisition, since they effectively surrender the permanent income
stream associated with their former positions.  This relation might be mitigated if
the CEO has strong employment possibilities outside the firm.
2 . CEO financial gains should be inversely related to the prominence of the CEO’s
new position in the buyer, if any.
3 . Older CEOs should extract lower monetary benefits, since the present value of the
lifetime income stream they surrender is lower.
4 . CEOs with greater bargaining power should obtain greater personal benefits.  We
measure bargaining power in two ways: (i) the ratio of the market capitalization of
the target relative to that of the buyer; and (ii) the percentage equity ownership of
the target CEO in his own firm.
5 . CEOs who do become top officers of the acquiror or receive other forms of
favorable treatment should be expected to agree to transactions with lower prices
paid to target shareholders.
Tables 5, 6 and 7 presents results of OLS regressions that test these hypotheses.
5.1 Relation between CEO financial gains
and subsequent postion in the firm
In Table 5, the dependent varaiable for the model in the first column equals the total
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monetary gains from all sources, including stock and option appreciation, golden parachutes,
augmented parachutes, and additional deal bonuses.  Explanatory variables include dummy
variables for whether the CEO becomes an officer or director of the target, CEO age, the market
capitalization of the target, the ratio between the target’s and buyer’s market caps, the percentage
ownership of the target CEO, and the excess return earned by the target’s stock in the year prior
to the acquisition (measured as the raw stock return minus the CRSP value weighted index).  The
right column shows the same model, but with the dependent variable equal to direct cash
payments to the CEO, excluding stock and option appreciation.  We find evidence that the CEO’s
total monetary gains are lower when he becomes an officer of the target, with an estimate of -$4.1
million that is significant at the 6 percent level.  However, the estimate falls to -$1.1 million and
loses significance when the dependent variable is restricted to cash compensation only.
In Table 6, we repeat the analysis from Table 5 but replace the officer dummy variable
with four dummies indicating different levels of responsibility: (i) the CEO takes a “top three”
post of CEO, president, or chairman; (ii) the CEO takes another executive position in top
management, such as executive or senior vice president; (iii) the CEO becomes vice chairman of
the board with no direct management responsibility; and (iv) the CEO becomes an officer of a
division of the buyer (usually his old firm, which becomes a wholly owned subsidiary).  The
coefficient estimates on these dummy variables are rank-ordered in an intuitive way.  CEOs who
move into top positions in the buyer appear to forego the largest financial gains from the merger
transaction, a result that makes sense because one expects them to earn greater future
compensation from their new posts.  Other executive officers sacrifice the second-most pay,
followed by vice chairmen and subsidiary officers.
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Our regression estimates of an inverse association between monetary gains and post-
merger executive positions do not extend to directorships.  Results in Table 5 indicate a weakly
positive but insignificant association between target CEOs’ financial gains and a dummy variable
for whether they join the board of directors of the buyer.
We do not find the expected relation between CEO age and monetary benefits.  In every
specification of both tables, we estimate a positive and significant coefficient on the age variable,
indicating the older CEOs extract greater financial gains from the merger transaction.  Although
older CEOs are sacrificing less future income by selling their firms, one might understand the
regression estimate in several ways.  Older CEOs might have greater tenure and influence over
corporate governance, meaning that the age variable really serves as a proxy for their ability to
obtain favorable compensation windfalls from their own boards of directors.  Older CEOs also
might seek greater personal financial gains from mergers because they will have fewer outside
employment opportunities than their younger counterparts.
Further indications of CEO bargaining power have coefficient estimates clearly in line with
our hypotheses.  CEOs who own more stock, and CEOs from firms whose relative size is closer
to the size of the buyer both succeed in extracting greater financial gains, according to estimates
in both models, although the CEO stock ownership result loses significance in the model shown in
the right column of each table, when the measurement of gains is restricted to merger-related cash
payouts.
We explored alternative specifications of the models in tables 5 and 6 without any
meaningful change in the results.  We do not include estimates for several additional control
variables which we might have expected to have significant estimates or affect other variables’
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coefficients; these include officer and director stock ownership (in percent), a dummy variable for
whether an exiting CEO obtains a CEO post in another firm, and various specifications of a
variable measuring the size of the largest block of stock.  None of these variables had significant
estimates, and we exclude them from the final model to keep our tables to a reasonable length.
5.2 Relation between CEO benefits 
and takeover premium to target shareholders
Table 7 explores the relation between personal benefits received by target CEOs and the
acquisition premia paid to their shareholders.  We focus on benefits indicating extraordinary
treatment of the CEO, and we deliberately omit appreciation of the CEO’s stock and option
holdings, since these gains will exhibit a lock-step positive association with the premium paid to
all shareholders.  Our main independent variables, used in the model in the first column of Table 7,
are dummy variables for (i) whether the CEO’s golden parachute is augmented at the time of the
transaction; (ii) whether the CEO received additional merger-related payments such as consulting
contracts or special bonuses; (iii) - (vi) four dummies indicating the level of executive position, if
any, obtained by the CEO in the buyer; and (vii) whether the CEO joins the board of directors of
the buyer.  We also include a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target CEO leaves the firm and
within two years becomes CEO of another firm.
As shown in the first column of Table 7, all seven of the dummy variables for CEO
personal benefits have negative coefficient estimates, though all of these estimates are
insignificant.  The pattern also applies to the dummy variable for CEOs who obtain new CEO jobs
in other firms.  The negative coefficients are consistent with a conjecture that CEOs negotiate less
24
favorable acquisition terms for their own shareholders when the transaction includes special
treatment of the CEO or in some way presents him with new career opportunities.
In the center column of Table 7, we estimate the same model but add together the seven
key dummy variables.  The coefficient on the sum of these dummies – equivalent to an F-based
hypothesis test of whether their sum is significantly different from zero -- has a negative estimate,
significant at the 8 percent level.
Finally, in the right column of Table 7, we repeat this analysis but restrict ourselves to the
subsample of CEOs who own less than the median amount of equity ($12.15 million) in their
firms.  We expect this group to be more predisposed in merger negotiations to trade off equity
appreciation for personal benefits, since they stand to lose less financially than CEOs with greater
ownership.  With the regression limited to this subsample, the coefficient estimate for the sum of
the seven dummy variables grows in magnitude by about 50 percent and becomes significant
below the 5 percent level.
As with earlier parts of the analysis, we estimated other versions of the model in Table 7
that included officer and director stock ownership, a dummy variable for whether an exiting CEO
obtains a CEO post in another firm, and various measures of block ownership.  None of these
variables had significant estimates or led to any noticeable change in our reported results.
6 . Conclusions
We study the personal benefits obtained by target company CEOs in successful merger
and acquisition transactions.  Our research is motivated by frequent news reports of large agency
conflicts in M&A bargaining situations.
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The magnitude of the CEO wealth increases that we document appear roughly in line with
the permanent income streams that they sacrifice by selling their firms.  We find that target CEOs
obtain wealth increases with a median of $4 to $5 million and a mean of $8 to $11 million.  These
financial benefits arise mostly from stock and option appreciation, though a majority of CEOs also
receive substantial golden parachute payments.  Some CEOs receive last-minute financial benefits
when their boards of directors vote to approve mergers, as 12 percent have their golden
parachutes increased and 28 percent receive a variety of additional cash bonuses.  The extra
payments, when made, typically add millions of dollars to the CEO’s merger gains.
Regression analysis indicates an inverse association between the CEO’s monetary benefits
and their new status (if any) in the merged firm.  About half of the target CEOs in our sample
become officers of the buyer, with a handful ascending into top management positions.  While
these executives receive higher compensation than before, we find that their new positions are
hazardous, with extremely high departure rates in the three years following completion of the
transaction.  A large majority of those executives who do lose their new jobs are compensated
through large severance payments.  Those CEOs who leave the firm usually end up retired or
working outside the private sector; only a small minority of our sample obtain new CEO posts
elsewhere.
We explore whether CEOs compromise the interests of their shareholders in those
transactions in which they receive extraordinary personal benefits.  Regression results provide
some evidence of an inverse association between selling shareholder premia and such CEO
benefits as positions in the buyer and unusual financial bonuses awarded at the time of the
transaction.
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Figure 1
Post-merger career paths of target CEOs
Career paths of CEOs of 311 large firms that are acquired between 1995 and 1997.  The first node shows the probability of the target CEO
remaining employed by the buyer at the time of the merger.  The second node shows, for those CEOs who survived the merger, the probability
of remaining employed represent various job titles and positions, along with summary statistics about the CEOs who reach those posts.  Wealth
Increase represents the gains from stock and option appreciation, golden parachutes, and other bonus payments as described more fully in the
text.  The sample is identified from the Securities Data Corporation database, and information about CEOs is obtained from proxy statements
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Table1
C haracteristicsofC EO sofacquiredcom panies
D escriptivestatisticsabouttheownership, com pensation, andothercharacteristicsofC EO s
ofacquired com panies. T he sam ple includes311large ¯rm sacquired between 1995and
1997.Thesam ple isidenti¯edfrom databasesm aintainedby SecuritiesD ata C orporation.
Inform ation aboutC EO sandtheir¯rm sisobtainedfrom proxystatem ents¯ledduringthe
lastyearpriortothetransaction.T hedum m y variablesforseparatechairm an andseparate
presidentequalone ifa person otherthan the C EO servesin thesepositions.
V ariable M ean M edian M ax O bs
C EO shares/sharesoutstanding 0.036 0.008 0.506 285
C EO totaloptions/sharesoutstanding 0.016 0.011 0.211 285
C EO salary priorto acquisition 423,322 351,489 2,493,795 289
C EO bonuspriorto acquisition 374,559 170,000 5,965,313 289
C EO age 53.886 54.000 74.000 290
C EO tenurelessthan 5yearsdum my 0.496 0.000 1.000 290
Separatepresidentdum m y 0.285 0.000 1.000 298
Separatechairm an dum m y 0.305 0.000 1.000 298
Table2
Transaction characteristics
D escriptive statisticsabout the acquisitionsof311 large ¯rm sbetween 1995 and 1997.
Inform ation isobtainedfrom databasesm aintainedby SecuritiesD ata C orporation andthe
C enterforR esearch in SecuritiesPrices.T he value oftargetandbuyer¯rm sism easured
onem onth priortothedateofthe¯rsto®er.T heprem ium receivedby targetshareholders
iscalculated relative to the transaction announcem entdate. SD C prem ium calculations
assum e that the transaction iscompleted according to termsannounced in the m erger
agreem ent.C R SP prem ium calculationsarebasedon actualm arketpricesofthe target's
stock.
V ariable M ean M edian M ax O bs
Targetvaluepriorto theo®er(000) 1,267,330 385,680 21,445,802 309
B uyervaluepriorto theo®er(000) 3,344,627 1,279,235 51,196,340 309
Targetvalue/buyervalue 0.442 0.317 3.020 309
U nsoliciteddum m y 0.026 0.000 1.000 309
Totalprem ium fourweeks, SD C data 0.348 0.304 1.259 308
Stock return, two days, C R SPdata 0.155 0.137 0.854 309
Stock return, 20days, C R SPdata 0.227 0.211 1.412 309
Table3
G ainsreceivedby targetC EO s
W ealth increasesandgovernanceconsiderationsobtainedby theC EO softarget¯rm s.T he
sam ple includes311large ¯rm sacquiredbetween 1995and1997.Inform ation isobtained
from Form S-4orsim ilardocum ents¯led with the SEC at the tim e ofthe acquisition.
G ainsin the value of C EO stock holdingsare com puted using four-week prem ium sas
m easuredby both the SD C and C R SP databases. O ption gainsare calculated sim ilarly
using an assum ption that alloptionsare at- orin-the-m oney priorto the transaction.
G olden parachutepaym entsarecalculatedbasedon inform ation from thetargetcom pany's
lastproxystatem ent¯ledpriortothetransaction.A ugm entedparachutesanddealbonuses
representadditionalpaym entsawardedto C EO satthetim eofthe acquisition.
PanelA :M onetary gains
V ariable M ean M edian M ax O bs
Stock gains
Sharegains(use20day C R SPreturn) 4,247,863 1,338,146 129,100,000 290
O ption gains(use20C R SPreturn) 656,451 229,908 8,267,318 283
C ash com pensation
Parachute 1,465,251 900,000 24,976,764 277
A ugm entation ofparachute 393,545 0 36,944,986 272
A dditionalbonus 1,201,011 0 60,000,000 272
Parachutedum m y 0.690 1.000 1.000 277
A ugm entation ofparachutedum m y 0.121 0.000 1.000 272
A dditionalbonusdum m y 0.279 0.000 1.000 272
Totalgains
Totalgains(20day C R SPstock return) 8,117,406 3,830,462 132,360,000 243
Totalgains(fourweek SD C prem ium ) 11,767,526 5,320,657 217,750,000 242
Totalgains/Salary+bonus(20day return) 10.175 6.440 118.200 242
Totalgains/Salary+bonus(fourweek prem ium ) 15.956 8.789 200.370 241
PanelB :O thergains
V ariable M ean M edian M ax O bs
C EO rem ainsaso± cer 0.503 1.000 1.000 290
C EO rem ainsasdirector 0.571 1.000 1.000 289
N umberoftargetm emberson new board 2.314 2.000 15.000 287
Targetboardm embers/new buyerboardsize 0.176 0.167 0.545 285
B uyerchangesnam e 0.147 0.000 1.000 279
Table4
StatusoftargetC EO swhobecom eo± cersanddirectorsofthebuyer
C om pensation and subsequent em ploym ent statusof C EO sof target ¯rm swho accept
positionswith the acquiror.T he sam ple includes311large ¯rmsacquiredbetween 1995
and1997.Inform ation isobtainedfrom Proxy Statem ents¯ledwith theSEC forthethree
yearsfollowing theacquisition.
PanelA :C EO status
V ariable M ean M ed M ax O bs
C EO rem ainsaso± cerafter1year 0.344 0.000 1.000 311
Frequency ofC EO surviving 1yearaso± cer 0.671 1.000 1.000 167
C EO rem ainsasdirectorafter1year 0.428 0.000 1.000 311
Frequency ofC EO surviving 1yearasdirector 0.776 1.000 1.000 165
C hange in C EO salary 1.176 1.086 6.752 98
C hange in C EO bonus 1.343 1.194 4.982 83
C EO receiving severance in year1dum my 0.132 0.000 1.000 281
Severancepaidin year1 3,770,864 1,500,000 30,000,000 37
PanelB :D eparturerateby C EO new position atnew ¯rm
C um ulativedeparturerateoftargetC EO
N ew position afterthem erger O neyear T wo years T hreeyears O bs
C EO , President, C hairm an 0.231 0.495 0.673 52
O therexecutiveo± cer 0.333 0.500 0.700 21
Executive in a subsidiary 0.255 0.627 0.783 51
V icechairm an 0.593 0.715 0.857 27
Table5
C EO m onetary gainsando®ercharacteristics
O rdinary leastsquaresestim atesofm onetary gainsobtainedby C EO sin a sample of311
large ¯rm sacquiredbetween 1995and 1997.T he dependentvariable in the left colum n
includesgainsfrom equity appreciation, option appreciation, golden parachutes, augm ented
parachutes, and additionalm erger-related bonuses. T he dependent variable in the right
colum n includesgainsfrom parachutesand bonusesonly. T he m arket capitalization of
targetandbuyer¯rm sism easuredone m onth priorto the ¯rsto®erm ade by the buyer.
Excessreturn on thetarget'syear-1ism easuredovertheoneyearperiodending 20days
priorto the announcem ent ofthe m erger. Excessreturn isrelative to the C R SP value
weighted index. D ata isobtained from Proxy Statem ents, Form sS-4, and sim ilarSEC
¯lings.
M ergergains, total M ergergains, cash
Intercept -24,453,886a -5,187,773
(3.38) (1.48)
TargetC EO rem ainsasan o± cer -4,077,630c -1,128,511
(1.93) (1.10)
TargetC EO rem ainsasdirector 1,870,238 484,722
(0.87) (0.47)
C EO age 487,667a 115,972c
(3.82) (1.88)
Targetvalue/buyervalue 4,003,761 1,980,332
(1.57) (1.60)
Targetvaluepriorto acquisition 1.79a 0.95a
(5.33) (5.87)
C EO shares/sharesoutstanding 75,136,933a 3,515,281
(5.96) (0.58)
Excessreturn on targetyear-1 4,265,199c 904,807
(1.90) (0.83)
O bservations 239 239
A djR 2 0.256 0.160
a,b,cdenotessigni¯cantly di®erentfrom zero atthe1, 5, and10percentlevels.
Table6
C EO m onetary gains
O rdinary leastsquaresestim atesofm onetary gainsobtainedby C EO sin a sample of311
large ¯rm sacquiredbetween 1995and 1997.T he dependentvariable in the left colum n
includesgainsfrom equity appreciation, option appreciation, golden parachutes, augm ented
parachutes, and additionalm erger-related bonuses. T he dependent variable in the right
colum n includesgainsfrom parachutesand bonusesonly. T he m arket capitalization of
targetandbuyer¯rm sism easuredone m onth priorto the ¯rsto®erm ade by the buyer.
D ata isobtainedfrom Proxy Statem ents, Form sS-4, andsim ilarSEC ¯lings.
M ergergains, total M ergergains, cash
Intercept -23,432,305a -4,884,797
(3.18) (1.38)
TargetC EO rem ainsin top3position -4,897,418c -2,244,855c
(1.93) (1.84)
TargetC EO rem ainsexecutiveo± cer -4,750,423 -1,269,654
(1.42) (0.79)
TargetC EO rem ainsasvicechairm an -2,313,109 787,225
(0.69) (0.49)
TargetC EO rem ainsaso± cerofsubsidiary -1,553,054 -283,777
(0.63) (0.24)
C EO age 475,991a 110,375c
(3.67) (1.77)
Targetvalue/buyervalue 4,650,893c 2,379,402c
(1.82) (1.93)
Targetvaluepriorto acquisition 1.88a 0.99a
(5.46) (5.97)
C EO shares/sharesoutstanding 73,549,883a 2,881,682
(5.83) (0.47)
Excessreturn on targetyear-1 3,969,703c 784,409
(1.77) (0.73)
O bservations 241 241
A djR 2 0.250 0.164
a,b,cdenotessigni¯cantly di®erentfrom zero atthe1, 5, and10percentlevels.
Table7
Tradeo® between C EO gainsandshareholderspremuim
O rdinary least squaresestim atesofshareholder'sstock premuim in a sam ple of311large ¯rms
acquiredbetween 1995and1997.T hedependentvariableisequalsthereturn totargetshareholders
overthe20-day periodupto and including the acquisition announcem entdate.R egressionsin the
leftandm iddle colum nsincludesthen entiresam ple.R egression in therightcolum nsinclude the
subsam plewherethetotalvalueofsharesandoptionsheldby theC EO isbelow thesam plem edian
$12.15m illion.
Targetreturn, 20days
Fullsam ple L ow C EO holdings
Intercept 0.0207 -0.0107 -0.0061
(0.17) (0.09) (0.04)
Sum ofallC EO bene¯ tdum m ies -0.0248c -0.0382b
(1.73) (2.14)
A ugm entation ofparachutedum m y -0.0296
(0.70)
A dditionalbonusdum my -0.0282
(0.92)
TargetC EO rem ainsin top3position -0.0134
(0.30)
TargetC EO rem ainsexecutiveo± cer -0.0710
(1.28)
TargetC EO rem ainsasvice chairm an -0.0065
(0.12)
TargetC EO rem ainsaso± cerofsubsidiary -0.0212
(0.55)
TargetC EO rem ainsasdirector -0.0279
(0.80)
C E O age 0.0050b 0.0055a 0.0066b
(2.44) (2.79) (2.46)
Targetvalue/buyervalue -0.0733c -0.0697c -0.0858
(1.87) (1.89) (1.55)
C E O shares/sharesoutstanding 0.1406 0.1537 -1.1442
(0.71) (0.79) (1.00)
C E O (shares+options)*price, (m illions) -0.0003c -0.0003c -0.0007
(1.86) (1.89) (0.13)
U nsoliciteddum my 0.1263 0.1339 0.1180
(1.41) (1.52) (1.19)
C E O ofanother¯rm -0.0379 -0.0353 -0.0457
(0.96) (0.92) (0.84)
Excessreturn on targetyear-1 0.0623c 0.0630c 0.0129
(1.81) (1.86) (0.31)
O bservations 252 252 126
A djR 2 0.052 0.070 0.081
a,b,cdenotessigni¯cantly di®erentfrom zero atthe1, 5, and10percentlevels.
